In Norway specialized health services are provided both by public hospitals and by privately practicing specialists who have a contract with the public sector. Patients' co-payment is the same irrespective of the type of provider they visit. The ambition of equity in the allocation of medical care is high among all political parties. The instruments for auditing whether these goals are fulfilled are not equally ambitious. The objective of the present study is to explore whether laws and regulations that govern the allocation of specialist health care resources in fact are fulfilled. Panel data from the Survey of Living Conditions are merged with data on capacity and spatial access to primary and specialist care. We find that accessibility and socio-economic variables play a considerable role in determining both the probability of at least one visit and the number of visits to a private specialist. A person with a higher university degree living in a municipality with the highest value of the geographical accessibility index has a 46%-points higher probability of at least one visit to a private specialist compared with a person with junior high living in a municipality with the lowest value of the accessibility index. With regard to visits to a hospital outpatient department these variables are not found to have significant effects.
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Summary
In Norway specialized health services are provided both by public hospitals and by privately practicing specialists who have a contract with the public sector. Patients' co-payment is the same irrespective of the type of provider they visit. The ambition of equity in the allocation of medical care is high among all political parties. The instruments for auditing whether these goals are fulfilled are not equally ambitious. The objective of the present study is to explore whether laws and regulations that govern the allocation of specialist health care resources in fact are fulfilled. Panel data from the Survey of Living Conditions are merged with data on capacity and spatial access to primary and specialist care. We find that accessibility and socio-economic variables play a considerable role in determining both the probability of at least one visit and the number of visits to a private specialist. A person with a higher university degree living in a municipality with the highest value of the geographical accessibility index has a 46%-points higher probability of at least one visit to a private specialist compared with a person with junior high living in a municipality with the lowest value of the accessibility index. With regard to visits to a hospital outpatient department these variables are not found to have significant effects.
We conclude that public ambitions and regulations are fulfilled for specialist services provided by public hospitals. With regard to the provision of services provided by publicly financed private specialists we find a discrepancy between public goals and surveyed practice.
INTRODUCTION
In publicly financed health service systems the unpredictability of the quality of health care has been well known for a long time. In national health care systems, as in Great Britain and the Nordic countries, people do not have individual contracts that specify what they should expect from their health service. In these countries priority assignment of patients is determined by the parliament in terms of laws and regulations. For instance in Norway, the Act on Patient Rights states that the allocation of health services should be determined by a combination of the seriousness of a patient's illness, the expected health gain of treatment and the health effect relative to the cost of treatment. The Act on Health Enterprises 3 states that the aim of the health enterprises is to provide high quality specialist health care on an equitable basis to patients in need, irrespective of age, sex, place of residence, material resources and ethnic background.
In this paper we use a population-based survey to study to what extent the aim of the health enterprises according to the law is fulfilled. Our data allow us to consider a broad selection of individual patient characteristics since we use Survey of Living Conditions data merged with data on capacity and spatial access to primary and specialist care.
Hence, the present study takes account of a full range of factors that could potentially influence the variation in utilization rates between individuals. We distinguish between visits to hospital outpatient departments and visits to private specialists financed by the National Insurance Scheme. We also empirically distinguish between access and utilization.
In a previous study (Iversen and Kopperud, 2003) we find from cross-section data that a person's self-assessed health contributes to the probability of outpatient visits and inpatient stays in the sense that poorer health increases the probability of use. The probability of visits to a private specialist is, however, less influenced by a person's self-assessed health. We also find that geographical access seems to influence the use of private specialists, but not the use of public hospitals. Objections could be raised against 3 Health Enterprises are independent state-owned enterprises responsible for providing hospital services and other specialist health care to the population.
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the cross-section data employed in that study. A serious one is the fact that health assessment is carried out at the time a person is interviewed, while the registration of medical care use relates to the twelve months preceding the interview. Hence, a person in good health now may previously have been in poor health and recovered after treatment. This indicates an insignificant relationship between health status and use of specialist care, according to the sequence of data registration. We cannot rule out the possibility that our missing relationship between health and utilization in the private sector is caused by a higher probability of gaining health in the private sector compared with the public sector. A closer study of this question requires panel data where health assessment and health care utilization are registered in an appropriate sequence.
In the study presented in this paper we have access to panel data from the Norwegian Survey of Living Conditions. Hence, we now possess data that show self-assessed health prior to the use of health services. Our main empirical results are that the probability of at least one visit to a hospital outpatient department depends on a patient's self-assessed health as predicted. Again, we find that the geographical access to the hospital does not have any impact on the use of outpatient services. Also, the probability of at least one visit to a private specialist depends on a patient's selfassessed health. In addition, the estimated probability is positively influenced by a person's level of education and geographical access to private specialists. In the concluding remarks we discuss the policy implications of our findings and in particular the need for setting up systems for auditing the implementation of public decisions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional framework. Section 3 presents the data. In Section 4 the estimation methods and empirical results are presented. Section 5 discusses the policy relevance and possible implications of the study.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Norway has a national health service. The parliament decides the institutional framework with regard to financing, ownership, and allocation of resources to the health sector and within the sector. The data that are used in the present study are from 1998- Private specialists also provide specialist health care. About 10 % of physicians engaged in specialist health care are in private practice. The proportion of specialist consultations that is taken care of be the private specialists is not known at the national level, but a rough guess is 20 per cent. Since 1 July 1998, funding from the National Insurance Scheme requires that a privately practicing physician has a contract with a county council (after 1 January 2002 with an appropriate regional health enterprise). The practice income of a contract physician is partly from a practice allowance and partly from a fee-for-service component, where a patient co-payment is included. About two third of a contract specialist's practice income is expected to come from public funding.
The patient's co-payment is independent of whether he is treated at a hospital outpatient department or by a contract specialist, and was about 20 USD per consultation at the time of data collection. Specialists without a contract are mainly located in the biggest cities and receive their total practice income directly from their patients. Hence, patients are likely to pay a considerably higher co-payment per consultation to a specialist without a contract compared with a hospital outpatient department or with a contract specialist. Although the exact number of specialists without a contract is not known, they are a tiny proportion of the total number of practicing physician specialists. Table 1 shows the distribution of contracts with private specialists and the distribution of population according to regional health enterprises.
( Table 1) From Table 1 we see that the centrally located enterprise Health East has just below one half of the total number of contracts and are responsible for specialist services to just above 1/3 of the country's population. On the other hand, Health North has 6% of the 6 total number of contracts and is responsible for 10% of the county's population. Hence, with a skewed distribution of specialist contracts towards urban parts of the country, we suspect that also the use of the specialists' services is skewed towards patients living in urban areas. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that patients living in rural areas are traveling to urban areas to see a specialist and hence, evening out the distribution of actual use of services according to patients' municipality of residence.
Nor can we rule out the possibility that patients living in rural areas are more likely to visit a hospital outpatient department, and hence even out the total use of specialist services between urban and rural areas. Accordingly, in order to study whether the laws that prescribe the allocation of health services are fulfilled, we need to analyze data on the population's actual use of health services.
The observed utilization pattern of specialist services is a result of an interaction between several decision-makers with separate objectives and constraints. Figure 1 depicts the main flow of patients.
(Figure 1)
For non-emergency care, an individual with symptoms of a disease usually visits a general practitioner (GP). GPs are either employed by or have a contract with a municipality, the lowest level of government. GPs are located in their own offices, and the distance to a private specialist or a hospital may well be long in remote areas of the country. According to Figure 1 , the GP may treat the patient himself or send a referral to a private specialist, a hospital outpatient department or admit the patient to an inpatient stay. The patient may also contact a specialist directly, since the role of the GP as a gatekeeper is not strictly adhered to. After treatment in the specialist sector, the patient may be referred back to general practice or to self-care.
Hence, there are four decision-makers determining a patient's use of specialist care: the patient himself, his GP, the private specialist and doctors at the public hospital. They have their specific preferences and constraints. The patient is assumed to have a preference for his own health, income and leisure, as standard in the health economics literature. Important constraints are time and income constraints and the production function for health. The GP is assumed to have preferences for his patients' health, and 7 his own income and effort (negative). He is also constrained by his budget, where income and cost components depend on the remuneration system imposed, and his time constraint. His decision variables are the kind of treatment he should initiate for each of his patients, including whether he should refer the patient to a private specialist or a hospital. We assume that the private specialist has the same kind of preferences as the general practitioner. Also for him the decision variables are the kind of treatment he should initiate for his patients, including whether he should refer a patient to a hospital or recommend further treatment in general practice. At the hospital level, physicians are salaried. Hence, their income is independent of the clinical decisions they make, although income and costs for the hospital may be affected. We assume that salaried hospital doctors have preferences for patients' health and own effort (negative) and that their decisions are compatible with the hospital's budget constraint. Visits to a hospital outpatient department and inpatient stays are rationed in the sense that a patient usually needs a referral to gain access to these services. A referral usually precedes a consultation with a private specialist too, but for some conditions a referral is not required. Some diagnostic and curative services are only provided by hospitals. The crucial decision variable for a hospital consultant is the kind of treatment that should be prescribed for each of the patients who are referred to the hospital. Alternative decisions are to admit the patient immediately as an inpatient or outpatient, put him on a waiting list or refer the patient back to general practice.
We highlight three groups of variables that contribute to whether a patient ends up with a consultation in private or specialist care or is treated by the GP he initially contacted.
The patient's health and type of medical problem
According to the Act on Patient Rights, the GP should consider the seriousness of the patient's illness, the expected health gain from further examination and treatment and the expected health effect relative to the cost of treatment when he/she decides on means of treatment. The GP's consideration of the patient's health status and potential for improvement is therefore crucial.
Capacity in general practice
We suggest that GPs are more inclined to refer patients to special health care the lower physician density in general practice in a local area is. The reason is that a low 8 physician density implies a high opportunity cost of providing services in terms of fewer patients that can be seen.
Capacity, organization and remuneration in the specialist sector
A low capacity in the specialist sector may imply a long waiting time for the patient or a high probability of having a referral rejected. A patient may therefore be better off by staying with the GP. Long travelling distances for seeing the specialist points in the same direction. Our data do not contain information about referrals. Hence, we cannot distinguish between contacts with and without referrals in the empirical section.
Since rationing 5 occurs to a greater extent in hospitals than in private practice, we would expect that patients' health status on average is better in private practice than in public hospitals. On the other hand, if GPs are worried about the waiting time patients may experience in hospitals, they may be likely to refer even patients with poor health to private specialists. A priori we therefore cannot conclude whether patients' health is expected to be better in private practice than in hospital outpatient departments. For both types of providers we can, however, predict that a decline in a person's health status should increase the likelihood of a visit if providers adhere to the national guidelines of prioritization.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Our data set is obtained by merging data from three different sources. The third data source is an index that describes the accessibility of specialized health care in Norway at the municipal level (Kopperud, 2002) . The construction of this index is inspired by the work of Carr-Hill et al. (1994) . The specialist care included is hospitals (outpatient and inpatient care) and privately practicing physician specialists with a contract with a county council. The index measures the availability of specialized health care in each municipality within each of the five health regions. Three elements are incorporated in the index: the capacity of the specialized health care in each municipality where the service is provided, the distance from a municipality to be served to the municipality where the service is provided, and a discount factor that converts the distance to estimated access. The capacity is measured along three dimensions: hospital beds, hospital physicians and private specialists.
The joint accessibility ikr A for the residents in municipality i in county k in region r is:
where k P is the population in county k , r P is the population in region r , and P is the total population in Norway. There are k n municipalities in county k , r n municipalities in region r and 435 municipalities in Norway, where 435 k r n n < < .
(1) j S is the capacity of the county level specialist health care in municipality j .
(2) j S is the capacity of the regional level specialist health care in municipality j . at least one visit to a private specialist, the average number of visits is 2.34, respectively 2.58 for visits to a hospital outpatient department. The distribution is skewed to the right (skewness=13.7 and 11.9, respectively). A rather small proportion of the sample consumes a large number of health services. Our data do not contain the number of hospital inpatient stays during the observation period.
The density of general practitioners at the municipal level is measured by the ratio GPs per 10,000 residents, and is a measure of the capacity in primary care in the residential municipality. The average GP ratio is 7.79 per 10,000 residents. 24% of the respondents have a regular health center and 60% have a personal GP.
Because of the long recall period (12 months), the reported number of visits may contain recall bias. In addition, the data contain no information on the total number of visits according to completed illness spells. It is likely that the data include incomplete spells. Some of the visits may be the result of an illness spell that started before the observation period, and counts may therefore be misinterpreted as first contacts. Some of the illness episodes may also continue after the observation period. As a result, the distribution of the number of visits may be mixed with left, right and no truncation.
Furthermore, contacts during the observation period may also be the result of several illness episodes and accordingly several first contacts.
Health status
The indicator of health care need is self-assessed health and chronic illnesses 9 . Selfassessed health is measured as a five-point health status scale: very good, good, fair, bad and very bad. In the whole sample, 76% state that they have very good or good health, although 31% report that they suffer from a chronic illness.
Socio-demographic characteristics
The sample is made up of 52% women, and the average age is 44.6 years. 26% of the sample has a university degree, and the average household income is NOK 338,000 10 . In the literature it is usual to distinguish between the first contact during an episode of illness and subsequent contacts. While the patient initiates the first contact, the physician (agent) in agreement with the patient (principal) initiates subsequent contacts.
ESTIMATION METHODS AND RESULTS
First
Hence, there may be different types of factors that influence the first contact compared with subsequent contacts. Recent contributions to the literature have aimed at distinguishing between the two kinds of decisions in the estimation procedure. As a consequence of the rejection of the single spell assumption in our data set, we are not able to distinguish between the contact decision and the follow-up decision in our analysis. Hence, our data do not allow us to interpret the first contact as the patient's decision and subsequent contacts as a provider's decision. The analysis is therefore confined to estimating the factors that influence the utilization of specialist services without distinguishing between patients' and providers' decisions. We use the software Limdep 8.0 in estimating the models.
When examining the factors that contribute to at least one contact, we consider a discrete dependent variable, Y , that shows whether an individual is a "non-user" ( 0 Y = ), a "user of private specialist services" ( 1 Y = ), a "user of public hospital outpatient services" ( 2 Y = ) or a "user of both types of specialist services" ( 3 Y = ).
Assuming a logistically distributed error term, the probability of being a "user of type j" condition. To check whether this condition is fulfilled we have also estimated the model when one option of specialist care is removed (for instance receiving care from both hospitals and private specialists). The estimated coefficients of the remaining options are robust with regard to this removal. Hence, we conclude that the IIA condition is fulfilled. 11 . Count data regression models (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) are used since the dependent variable is measured as nonnegative integer counts. We start with the standard Poisson distribution. An important property of the Poisson model is that the mean equals the variance. This assumption is sometimes too restrictive (Mullahy, 1997) . We see from Table 2 that in our case the variance exceeds the mean to a considerable extent. Hence, the negative binomial model, which allows for over-dispersion, i.e. the variance to differ from the mean (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) , is also estimated. We test the Poisson models for overdispersion according to Cameron and Trivedi (1990) . The loglikelihood ratio when testing the negative binomial (NB) model against the Poisson model, is 1672.97 (the number of visits to a privately practicing physician during the last 12 months) and
The dependent variable in the second part of the analysis measures the number of visits to a privately practicing physician during the last 12 months, and the number of hospital outpatient visits during the last 12 months
(the number of hospital outpatient visits during the last 12 months).
The NB models increase the log likelihood significantly, and this leads to rejection of the Poisson models. The over-dispersion parameter alpha in the negative binomial models is positive and significant for both models. Hence, there is strong evidence of overdispersion and we continue with the NB models.
The results of the estimated models are shown in Table 3 12 . We focus on the effect of self-assessed health, socio-demographic characteristics and access to health care on the use of specialist health care. Being a man affects the probability of a visit negatively, while a higher degree contributes positively to a visit to a private specialist compared to junior high as highest degree. Having a high university degree increases the probability of at least one visit to a private specialist by 11 %-points at the margin compared with junior high as the highest degree. There is no effect of education on the occurrence of visits to public hospitals. Also household income has a positive impact on the use of private specialists, 15 but not on the use of hospitals. The age effect is more uniform for hospitals than for private specialists in the sense that the oldest age group both has the highest probability of a visit and the highest number of visits.
Individuals with a personal GP have a significantly (1%) higher probability of a visit to a hospital outpatient department. We also find that the number of hospital outpatient visits increases with a personal GP (significant at 1%), and with having a regular health center (significant at 5%). These effects of an individual's relations to primary care physicians are not found for the number of visits to private specialists.
The higher the GP per resident ratio is, the lower are the probability of a visit and the number of visits to a private specialist (significant at 1%). These effects are not found for visits to hospital outpatient departments, and indicate that private specialists function as an alternative to primary care physicians.
While there is no effect of accessibility on the probability of a visit to the hospital outpatient department, there is a positive impact of the accessibility index for private specialist on the probability of a visit to a private specialist. At the margin an increase of one point increases the probability of a visit by 1.2 %-points. This implies that other things equal, the probability of at least one visit is 10-15 %-points higher if you live in an urban area compared with the remote areas of the country. The effect of accessibility is also valid for the number of visits.
In sum, we could say that accessibility and socio-economic variables play a considerable role in determining the probability of at least one visit and the number of visits to a private specialist. A person with fair health and a higher degree of university education living in a municipality with the highest value of the accessibility index has in fact 46%-points higher probability of at least one visit to a private specialist than a person with fair health and junior high living in a municipality with the lowest value of the accessibility index. With regard to visits to a hospital outpatient department these types of variables are not found to have significant effects.
An interesting question is whether there is an effect of the interaction between access and a patient's health status. Another candidate is an interaction between health status 16 and education. We included these interaction variables without finding statistically significant effects. Hence, we dropped the interaction effects among the results displayed in Table 3 .
It should be mentioned that the predictive power of the model is moderate. Based on a threshold probability of 0.31 (the proportion of the sample who report any visit to specialist health care), 1634 of 2427 non-users and 648 of 1074 users of any specialist service are correctly predicted. This result corresponds to a positive predicted value of 0.45 and a negative predicted value of 0.79.
Visits to private specialists are registered for the two subsequent years 1999 and 2000.
Panel data may improve the estimation by increasing the number of observations per individual. Because of unobserved heterogeneity error terms are likely to be correlated over time. Unobserved heterogeneity could be handled also for models with discrete dependent variables (Green, 2003, 698) . In this paper we have chosen a technically less where µ 0 and µ 1 are threshold parameters to be estimated. Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of this ordered probit model. The sign of the statistically significant variables are similar to what we found when only the last period was considered separately (Table 3) . (Table 4) Table 4 also shows the effect of independent variables on the average annual number of visits during the last two years. Since this variable is considerably skewed to the right, a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable is done and heteroscedasticity robust (White) estimators are obtained. The estimation produces statistically significant effects similar to the effects estimated with data only from year 2000 survey (Table 3) 14 .
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The motivation for this study has been to explore whether the laws and regulations that govern the allocation of health care resources are fulfilled. In Norway the ambitions of all political parties are high in this field, as seen by the laws approved by the parliament and described in the introductory section of this paper. In particular, an individual's use of specialist health services should depend on the individual's need and should not depend on age, sex, income, municipality of residence etc. Since politicians are often reluctant to give verifiable commitments, the instruments for auditing whether these goals are fulfilled are not equally ambitious. This is due both to the chance of alienating voters and to the chance of being held liable for broken promises. For instance, the Act on Patient Rights states that a patient has a right to treatment only if the expected health gain from treatment is reasonable compared with the cost of treatment. In order to judge whether a patient in fact has a right to be treated, we need to know what a reasonable relationship between effect and cost is. So far, no politician has been willing to be precise on this matter. On the contrary, politicians who approved the law label decisionmakers who ask for an upper limit as cold and cynical.
As a result, reluctance to give commitments spills over to reluctance to initiate studies of whether laws and regulations are implemented. Since equity is a relative concept, an individual complaint is insufficient evidence to conclude that a system is inequitable according to its own standard of equity. Hence, auditing requires systematic collection of data from hospital files and population surveys.
14 Care should be taken when considering the magnitude of the effects on the unlogged dependent variable, see Manning (1998) .
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In this paper we have used a data set constructed to shed light on whether laws and regulations in fact are implemented. This data set is made by merging survey data with data on geographical access to primary care and specialist care. We found that the use of hospital outpatient clinics was closely related to a person's self-assessed health in the sense that poor health is likely to increase the use of hospital outpatient services. We found no effect of the access to specialist health care depending on a person's municipality of residence. On the other hand, the use of private specialists was positively related to the geographical access to the specialists. Also a person's level of education contributed positively to the use of private specialist services.
For both types of services, an individual's age and sex contributed to the use of specialist services. That men use health services to a lesser extent than women is well known from other studies (for instance, Elstad, 1991) . That age has an effect in addition to self-assessed health may indicate that people's perception of good health is influenced by their age. The effect of a personal GP might have been positive or negative depending on whether the GP's role as his patient's agent dominates the gatekeeper role. The positive effect on the use of hospital outpatient services means that the role as the patient's agent dominates. This result corresponds to the findings in a recent Norwegian study (Carlsen and Norheim, 2003) . It may also be that people in poor health to a greater extent have a personal GP compared with people in good health.
Hence, health status and having a regular GP are likely to be correlated. We have therefore done sensitivity analysis. It turns out that the coefficients are stable irrespective of whether the regular GP variable is included or not.
Our study adds to the literature of whether persons in equal need of treatment receive similar treatment regardless of their income, as reviewed by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000) . They conclude that there is growing evidence that, in the US, the distribution of health care by income is not consistent with health care being allocated according to need. There is some evidence that pro-poor inequities in inpatient care are compensating for pro-rich inequities in specialist and outpatient care. Within the EU countries Wagstaff and van Doorslaer do not find a straightforward link between the features of the system and the degree of inequity.
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In short, the results of our study show that public ambitions and regulations seem to be fulfilled for the specialist services provided by the public hospitals. With regard to the provision of services provided by publicly financed private specialists we find a discrepancy between the public goals and the actual characteristics of the patients treated.
In contrast to what the Act on Health Enterprises prescribes, the use of private specialists depends on education and municipality of residence.
These findings have implications both for the regional health enterprises and for the institutions responsible for auditing the implementation and maintenance of public policy. The office of the Auditor General of Norway is the controlling agency of the Norwegian Parliament, and hence, the institution that is expected to verify whether laws and regulations are adhered to. Since the present study is rather broad, a follow-up could be a study of patient flows with more detailed information on activities and the composition of patients. If such a study confirms our results, the regional health enterprises are obliged to decentralize the location of private specialists or to make it less costly for patients in rural areas to visit private specialists. Another possible action would be to make the policy goals less ambitious with regard to equity. This alternative requires the parliament's approval and is for obvious reasons not politically attractive, in particular in a country where rural interests have a strong impact on political decision-making. 
